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Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has emerged as a new concept for the U.S. Navy.  NCW
capitalizes on technology to obtain and maintain an enhanced situational awareness and uses the
distributed offensive firepower of the collective force to fight the battle. Speed of Command and
Self-Synchronization are key tenents of NCW. The authors propose an organization designed to
operate in the NCW environment. It consists of the Force Commander and Commanders of
Situational Awareness, Resources, Effects, and Operations. The research question is whether or
not the proposed organization’s is fit in the NCW environment. The organization is studied using
two “snapshots”: one is the planning process and the other is the execution process. The expert
system Organizational Consultant is used to analyze the organization and determine its
organizational fitness.  The results indicate that the proposed organization is fit if changes are
made to make the planning process highly centralized and the execution process decentralized.
Formalization will also need to be lowered in the organization.
1. Introduction
Recently the Navy has been studying and experimenting with Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
as a warfighting concept for Conflict in the Information Age.  An important aspect of
understanding  Network Centric Warfare is the impact on the configuration and decision
processes of command and control by the information technology now available and anticipated
over the next decades.  The history of military organizations suggests that technology provides
the commander with a rich menu of alternative means to implement command and control.
Success in the battlespace is then used to focus on a best way to accomplish command and
control.  Currently information technology innovation has created another point in history where
there is a search for a battlespace effective command and control configuration and decision
processes.  The focus of this paper is using the current state-of-the-art of organizational science
to understand the characteristics of the Navy combat organization needed for combat success –
fitness in the combat landscape.
Basically there are three categories of organizational analysis useful for the purpose at hand.  The
first type is called organizational ecology.  Here individual organizations are treated as
“blackboxes” with goal(s) and a transformation of inputs into outputs.  The interaction of the
organizations in the ecology leads to some organizations being successful and others dying out of
the population.  The second type of analysis assumes the characteristics of the organization’s
environment and studies the characteristics of the organization needed for fitness in that
environment.  The last mode of analysis assumes the characteristics needed for environmental
fitness and seeks the configuration and decision processes needed to diagnosis and solve the
organization’s problems.  This “moves” the organization to fitness.  This study uses the second
type of analysis.
2. The Proposed Organization
The  proposed organization has its origin in a proposal by LCDR Alistair Bochert and Captain
Michael LeFever, developed during the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
(SSG) XVII (SSG XVII, 1998).  Although this organization was developed and thought about
during the SSG, many of the ideas presented here are different from those presented in the SSG
report.  This work was continued as a thesis project at the Naval Postgraduate School where
LCDR Alistair Borcher was Joint C4I Systems student.  The ideas presented here are those of the
authors and not necessarily of the SSG or the Naval Postgraduate School.
This organization is designed to operate in a NCW environment.  It is not designed for one
specific mission, rather it is flexible and adaptable so it can be changed to suit the mission in
both objectives and scale, while still retaining the same basic functional elements and decision
processes.
It has been said that “the challenge for the U.S. military is to develop new organizational
structures that achieve the efficiencies and creativity businesses have gained in the virtual and
reengineered environments, while at the same time retaining the elements of the traditional,
hierarchical, command and control system essential for operations in the combat arena.” (Huber,
1996, p xiii)  The authors believe the approach to such an organization has been captured in the
following proposal.
The core of the organization is focused on the functions and processes that the force will need to
self-synchronize.  There are still commanders of platforms (e.g. ship commanding officers)
however there will be a fundamental change in their roles and responsibilities.  They will
become, similar to the Chief of Naval Operations today, responsible for  “manning, training, and
equipping” the platform.  The fighting of platforms will be done by a different organization.  It is
important to note that a ship commanding officer could, and likely would, be “dual hatted” as
both the platform commanding officer and one of the functional (warfighting) commanders
presented below.
All of the weapons brought to the fight by a platform will be available for the entire force to use,
not just for the one platform.  We will no longer “fight the platform” (except in self-defense), we
will take advantage of the distributed offensive firepower of the entire force and the combined
effects the weapons bring to the fight.
To carry out the advantages of using the distributed offensive firepower of the entire force, the
basic organization is composed of the Force Commander, a Situational Awareness function, a
Logistics function, an Effects function, and Operations function. This organization, with the

































Figure 1. The Basic Organization.
In certain situations (described later), a Mission Commander role may also be activated.
Force Commander
The most obvious role of the force commander is to command the force.  The Commander is,
and should always be, responsible for the actions of the forces assigned.  The commander has
several specific roles, each a part of command: resource allocation, promulgation of intent,
decide on courses of action, develop and maintain situational awareness, and perform a meta-
cognitive function.
When there is a requirement to perform any task the commander must allocate resources to
complete the task.  Resource allocation is not an easy chore because many times assets are scarce
and they must be distributed across many tasks, all competing for resources.  Some assets may
have multiple capabilities (e.g. sensors and shooting).  This further complicates the resource
allocation function.
There are numerous ways to accomplish a mission, but there may only be a few feasible or
satisfying solutions.  Generally, the staff will generate several courses of action (COA ) for the
commander using decision support systems and modeling and simulation tools. The commander,
using these aids, will select a particular COA or a combination of COAs and then direct it to be
carried out.  This becomes the commanders intent.
The commander must promulgate his/her intent so the forces know what end state they are
striving to achieve.  Without knowing the intent, there is no way for self-synchronization to
occur.  It is the understanding of the desired end state, not necessarily how to get there that
matters, although collaborative planning and, in certain situations, being told how to achieve the
end state, can help.
Events on the battlefield will occur too fast for the commander to dictate every action -
centralized control will not work.  The intent enables subordinates to anticipate the commander’s
desired and take actions to implement them.
It is imperative that the commander has the “big picture”. Overall situational awareness must be
maintained to effectively integrate and utilize the force elements.  It is of utmost importance that
the commander’s staff, and the other command functions, provide the right information to the
commander at the right time and in the right form.
Information management is the key in providing situational awareness.  To prevent overload or
fixation on extraneous data a common integrated picture (CIP) must be developed and
maintained on the net so everyone has access to consistent information.  The Chief Knowledge
Officer (CKO) of the organization is responsible for building and presenting this common
integrated picture to the commander and the rest of the force.
In an organization there has to be someone who can step back from the current situation and
assess how the organization is performing.  Meta-cognition means “thinking  about thinking”.
There is no one better than the commander (possibly with the Chief of Staff) to do this function.
Self-critique is invaluable for improvement and adaptation to occur. The recognition of
limitations, either your own, the staff’s, or the organization’s is the trigger for adaptation.
Correcting or mitigating them is central to adaptation.  Meta-c gnition should be addressed at
two levels in the force: the staff (is the commander being supported effectively by the staff?) and
the organization of the entire force (is the force organized for efficient performance or is there a
better way to do things?
Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO)/Situational Awareness (SA)
The Situational Awareness (SA) function is a combination of the intelligence (the “2”) and
communications (the “6”) functions of today and is commanded by the Chief Knowledge Officer
(CKO).  It is the CKO’s job to manage all information in the force.  Information will be managed
as a pooled resource, with direct access controlled according to security control and access
privileges.  But the CKO is not merely a manager of information; the CKO is a commander. The
CKO has direct command over all dedicated sensor systems which may reside on multi-mission
platforms, like a radar on a ship, or may be solely dedicated to gathering situational awareness
information, like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  The CKO will control these assets to
effectively gather knowledge and build the enhanced situational awareness upon which the force
will rely.  To coordinate these assets on each platform, the CKO will have Knowledge Officers
(KO) under his command. KO are working for the CKO to build the situational awareness for the
force.
The CKO also maintains the CIP showing positions of friendly, enemy, and neutral platform and
assets, as well as, any unresolved contacts.  The CIP must show where ambiguities in contact
information exist.  CKO coordinates all national assets and brings the right information to the
force from national sources.  CKO identifies gaps in sensor and intelligence coverage and takes
action with his dedicated assets to maximize the coverage.  CKO must also be able to display
where these gaps in sensor and intelligence coverage exist.  It is the CKO’s job to maintain all
communications assets, as well as ensure the security of those communications.  CKO must
protect our physical systems from exploitation by the adversary (defensive information warfare).
CKO also attempts to predict the enemy intent.  During offensive attacks, the CKO performs all
battle damage assessment.
Chief Resources Officer (CRO)/Logistics (LOG)
The Chief Resources Officer (CRO) is responsible for the logistics support of the entire force.
The CRO ensures re-supply and delivery, from the source to the user, of all food, munitions,
parts, POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) and personnel.  This re-supply is based on anticipated
usage and actual consumption rates.  If required, the CRO is responsible for any salvage
activities or contracting actions which may need to be done in theater.  The CRO also maintains
the logistics database.
The CRO is a commander of the logistics platforms and resources which will carry out re-supply
of the force.  On each platform is a Resource Officer (RO) who will carry out the direction of the
CRO.
Chief Effects Officer (CEFO)/Effects (EF)
Effects is where decisions are made concerning fighting the battle which enables leveraging of
the distributed offensive firepower of the force.  The Chief Effects Officer (CEFO) is responsible
for this process.  The CEFO commands all the weapons and weapons systems in the force.
These assets are the CEFOs to use in the most effective way to carry out the intent of the
commander.
The CEFO relies heavily upon decision support systems to help carry out effects tasks.  The
CEFO ensures all targets are prioritized and duly targeted, coordinates all fire support requests,
and matches the target with the most appropriate weapon.  In some cases, CEFO will have to
hold back some weapons, husband assets, to prevent too many weapons from being fired at one
target or weapons usage rate from being too high.  CEFO must ensure the deconfliction system is
running properly and resolve any problems the decision support system can not handle.  Besides
the kinetic weapons, CEFO is responsible for non-lethal weapons, to include offensive IW. The
CEFO commands all platforms that are solely dedicated to the effects process (such as
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)) and has control over the weapons on multi-
mission platforms. Working on each platform for the CEFO is an Effects Officer (EFO).
It is important to note that the effects function is arguably the most centralized process. Almost
all the engagement deconfliction decisions, as well as, determining what platform will fire, will
need to be made by an automated decision support system (as programmed by the CEFO, based
on the intent of the commander), and then broadcast on the network.  This becomes a centralized
process, with decentralized execution.  Firing of weapons can be done remotely by the CEFO or
by any EFO.
Effects is separate from OPS, as the effects process is focused on the weapons and their effects
and the employment of these weapons.  OPS, as described below, focuses on the total force and
the proper balance between the CKO, CRO, and CEFO.
Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Operations (OPS)
Operations (OPS), commanded by the Chief Operating Officer (COO), is where the day to day
execution of the force is carried out. The COO directs the tactical execution of the force, to
include stationing of units which are not under the command of the CKO, CRO or CEFO.  These
include multi-mission platforms performing several competing functions at once. In the case of
one platform performing several functions, the COO takes the potentially competing
recommendations of the CKO, CRO, and CEFO and decides the positioning of the force’s
platforms for the effective positioning of sensor, weapons, and logistics assets.
Other functions of the COO include future force employment, the near real time planning and
execution functions, force protection, simulation and event reconstruction analysis.  On each
platform is an Operations Officer (OPS) who works for the COO.
Relationships in the Organization
In a platform centric view, each platform brought its weapons to the battle and each platform was
considered as a whole.  Under NCW, this changes. Now each individual sensor and weapon (not
platform) will be considered individually and how it (not the platform) can contribute to the
force.  Weapons, and the control of each weapon, can be distributed throughout the force.  This
new perspective changes the relationships in the organization, and allows for capability tasking
vice unit tasking.
The commanders (CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO) must work closely together and keep the success of
the force, not just their respective functions, at the forefront when carrying out a mission.  A
commander who is not concerned about the entire force, will do more harm than good.  We are
trying to fight the force as a whole and effectively use the capabilities brought to the battle in a
distributed fashion.
While each command function has its own unique responsibilities, it is working for the force
commander and towards the commander’s overall goal.  CKO and COO have the most
responsibility, while the CRO and CEFO functions are clearer and have less ambiguous
solutions.  COO makes many decisions on behalf of the commander (i.e. force positioning of
multi-mission assets), however, if one of the other functions has very strong objections to the
decision of the COO, they may take their case directly to the force commander for arbitration.
In the case of a multi-mission platform, such as a ship, where the CKO is commanding the radar
systems, the CEFO is commanding the weapons, the CRO is commanding the resources, and the
COO is carrying out the mission, there will likely be instances where not everyone can agree.
Hopefully, due to the commanders self-synchronizing their efforts, these instances will be rare,
but when they do occur, the force commander will need to step in and allocate the asset’s
resources. Allocation of assets is one of the roles of the commander, so if the CKO, CRO, CEFO,
and COO can not agree, the force commander will make the ultimate decision.
Platform Commanders
So if the force commander, CKO, CRO, CEFO, and COO are commanding the force, where does
this leave the traditional platform commander? The platform commander is concerned about
“manning, training, and equipping” the platform.  The platform commander (e.g. a ship’s
commanding officer) still has command of the platform and is still responsible for safe
navigation and safety of the crew, but now the platform commander brings the platform to the
battle, then enables other people, either on board or remotely, to use all the assets on the ship.
The platform commander must make sure all systems are operating properly so they can be used
in the most effective manner across the force.
On each platform the KO, RO, EFO, and OPS are working for the chief of each function (the
CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO), see Figure 4-2, but the platform commander will still be involved in













































Figure 2. Organizational Relationships.
It is important to point out the one situation where the platform centric view still holds true: self-
defense of the platform.  The platform commander (ship’s commanding officer) can override the
CKO, CRO, CEFO, or COO if the platform must respond immediately to ensure its survivability.
An exception to this may be when the force commander decides that a platform may have to take
a hit to protect another more important asset.
Mission Commanders (MC)
The addition of mission commanders (MC), see Figure 3, makes the proposed organization























































































Figure 3. Mission Commanders.
In Figure 3, the new MC is a section of the old force which has been “spun off” for a specific
mission. In a sense, the force commander moves up a level and also functions as a MC for the
original force (reporting to him/herself), while the new MC reports to the force commander.
Mission commanders can be activated in several situations.  A mission commander can be
activated when: the complexity of a mission is high and requires special focus, the mission
requires a unique capability, to prevent overload of the functional commanders (i.e. span of
control is too large to handle), or forces are required to leave the protection afforded by mutual
protection of forces close together.
The assets, both platforms, sensors, and weapons, assigned to the mission are organized around
the mission they are assigned.  Any asset can be assigned to a mission commander.  It all
depends on the mission and the best solution to the problem.  The assets assigned are dedicated
to the mission commander and for accomplishing the mission.
The Mission Commander concept is designed to give the MC the forces needed to complete the
sub task or mission, let the MC organize these forces, plan and execute the mission, and then
return main force where the MC and the assigned forces revert to their previous roles (or new
roles).
While being adaptable to any situation, standing up a mission commander will not generate
unfamiliar command relationships.  The newly formed mission commander will also have a
CKO, a CRO, a CEFO, and a COO, and each platform will have a KO, a RO, a EFO, and an
OPS.  Ideally, the people carrying out these roles on the platforms will not change, only he focus
of their efforts (the new mission) will change.
The mission commander’s organization may be comprised of forces that are not familiar with
each other, although it is best if they have worked and trained together. However, the functions
(SA, EFF, LOG and OPS) are still the same as before the activation of the mission commander
and relationships between force assets assigned to the mission commander are the same as when
they were working for the force commander.
Experiments carried out under the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2)
program support the idea of an organization focused on a specific task.  Previous research found
that organizations had a higher level of performance if there was a match between the task, the
environment, and the organizational design (Kemple, 1998, p. 5).  Also, in highly uncertain and
highly dynamic environments, an organization that can adapt is favorable (Bowditch, 1997, p.
280).
The Process of Self-Synchronization
The following helps to examine the process of self-ynchronization which an organization might
use. Five KOs, on different platforms, are working to build the enhanced situational awareness
upon which the force is relying.  They are updating the CIP, monitoring systems that update the
CIP, and monitoring the sensor as ets which they control.  The CKO is monitoring the KOs
compliance with the CKO intent, which is itself based on the force commander’s intent. All the
KOs are communicating with each other using the information grid. The KOs are equal in
authority as there is no hierarchy amongst the KOs.  As one KO sees an opportunity which can
be exploited, he/she either takes action, using assets under the KO’s control, or alerts another KO
of the opportunity.  If there are disagreements amongst the KOs, or the CKO sees an opportunity
which has not been seen, the CKO will direct one of the KOs to take action.
While the CKO and the KOs are working on building the situational awareness, the CEFO and
the EFOs are working on having the right assets (weapons) ready for any action which may be
pending.  The EFOs ensure that the weapons and weapons systems under their control are ready
for combat and disposed so the offensive capabilities of the force are in the most effective
position.  In the same way there is no hierarchy amongst the KOs, there is none for the EFOs.
Any disagreements amongst the EFOs, of which should be few as decision support systems
should tell the EFOs where to position the weapons for maximum coverage and effects, will be
resolved by the CEFO.
If there are disagreements between the KO and EFO of a particular multi-mission capable
platform and both missions are being performed simultaneously (e.g. providing both sensor
coverage and weapons coverage), then the OPS on each platform, working with the COO, will
resolve the conflict.  The CKO and CEFO must remember that the “big” picture is what matters.
Some give and take between all individuals is vital as resources will always be in short supply.
If the issue cannot be resolved locally, and the CKO, CEFO, and COO can not work together to
solve the problem, the force commander must make the ultimate decision regarding asset
allocation and utilization.
In matters regarding the logistics function, the RO and CRO function in the same manner as the
other functions.
Planning and execution processes
Although this organization is designed to function as one cohesive unit, there are two distinct
processes occurring within the NCW organization at the same time; one is the planning process
and the other is the execution process.
The planning process is highly centralized.  The force commander and his staff will generate the
commander’s intent and decide how to allocate resources.  The individual KO, RO, EFO, and
OPS have little, if any, input into this process.  It is very centralized.
On the other hand, the execution process is very de-centralized. It is capitalizing on forces self-
synchronizing their efforts to carry out the commanders intent.  The force commander is not
heavily involved in this process, except to monitor events, ensure that they meet the intent, and
resolve any disputes.  This is a very de-centralized process.
Obviously there are not two distinct NCW organizations.  Unity of command as well as unity of
effort are required to carry out the mission. However, the two processes (planning and execution)
are so distinct that they are analyzed as different processes.
3.  The Organizational Analysis
Contingency Theory
Organizational theory focuses on the understanding of organizations.  It is a multidisciplinary
science with distinct viewpoints. Contingency theory is a dominant theme in organization theory.
Contingency theory suggests that the effectiveness, efficiency, profitability, and viability of an
organizational design is contingent or dependent upon such factors as size, strategy, technology,
environment, and managerial preferences (Baligh et al, 1996, p. 1650).  Figure 4 presents the


































































Figure 4. Contingency Theory - Organizational Design Model
This model is the basis for the knowledge base in the Organizational Consultant expert system.
The knowledge base is derived from the vast contingency theory literature.  It is used in a series
of “if-then” rules to ensure proper fit Between the contingency factors (the “if” part) and the
properties and structural configuration of the organization (the “then” part).  Organizational
Consultant uses these “if-then” rules according to a particular logical process to produce
recommendations on the design of an organization.  The designed structure is examined for the
fit between its parts and its environment and also the fit between it and the existing structure.
The organizational structure must be appropriate for the situation (or situations) it will operate in
and the organization must also function well as a whole.  The term used for describe these two
conditions is “fit” (Baligh et al, 1996, p. 1653). Fit must be achieved in the environment and also
within the organization.
An effective and efficient organizational design needs to have a proper fit simultaneously
throughout all the dimensions of Figure 4. There has to be a fit among the contingency factors
themselves (Management style, Climate, Size/Ownership, Environment, technology, and
strategy). This is called situational fit. There has to be a fit between the contingency factors,
listed on the left side of Figure 4, and the design parameters on the right side of the figure.  This
is called contingency fit.  There also has to be a fit among the design parameters - called design
parameter fit (Baligh et al, 1996, p. 1650).  The final type of fit, total design, is the most
demanding of all.  It assumes that the contingency fit, situational fit, and the design parameter fit
criteria have all been met (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 18).  All four fit criteria are necessary to
obtain a useable system.
Situation fit is based on the contingency factors for organizational structure: management style,
climate, size/ownership, environment, technology, and strategy. To change any of these
contingency factors requires a change to take place in either the environment or the organization.
It is difficult to alter the situation fit.  For example, one of the contingency factors is technology.
For an organization to transition from a situation where few technology systems being used to
where many advanced technology systems are being used requires a great deal of effort and can
change the way an organization functions.
Situation fit requires that the design situation be internally consistent.  Situational facts, which
give answers to the “if” questions, must make sense.  For example, an equivocal environment
and a routine technology do not fit.  There is a recommended design for this situation, and, since
it is not being met, it is a situational misfit (Burton and Obel, 1998, p 17).
Control of situational misfits (and ensuring they continue to fit in the environment) is key to
organizational success. Only those organizations that manage to identify the proper misfits and
resolve them will be successful (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 17).
For each design parameter listed on the right hand side of Figure 4, the set of if-then propositions
that lead to a design recommendation must fit and be in balance.  For example, a design
recommendation that the organization should be decentralized can be driven by a number of
contingencies. Management style, climate, size, environment, technology, and strategy may all
strongly suggest decentralization.  However, the more likely situation is that there are also design
propositions that suggest more centralization.  Here the design propositions must be in proper
relative balance to obtain a good fit. Certainty factors, discussed below, help obtain proper
design parameter fit (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 17).
Contingency fit is the underlying organizing concept that joins together situation fit and design
parameter fit.  It explains how situation fit and design parameter fit are based on contingency
theory and work together. Contingency fit is labeled as such in Figure 4.
Each if-then contingency proposition must be consistent with contingency theory.  A rule that
states “If the organization is large, then the structure should be centralized” does not fit with
what contingency theory tells us and should not be a part of the knowledge base (Burton and
Obel, 1998, p. 16).
Contingency fit criterion can largely be achieved by adhering to the contingency theory literature
and translating this into appropriate if-then statements for the organization (Burton and Obel,
1998, p. 17).
Total fit assumes that situation fit, design parameter fit, and contingency fit are all in balance.
Total design fit requires that the design recommendations fit together internally and fit the actual
situation (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 18). Total design fit is the reality check - it asks “can the
recommendations be used in real life?”
Even with a situational fit and a contingency fit, design parameter fit may not be present.  This is
due to the fact that each contingency relationship may lead to more than one design
recommendation.  The right set or combination has to be chosen to obtain total design fit. Total
design fit may be impossible to obtain if a serious situational misfit exists (Burton and Obel,
1998, p. 18).
Organizational Consultant Expert System
Organizational Consultant is an expert system which relies on a knowledge base derived from a
combined large body of literature on organizational theory and a body of expertise on
organizational design.  Its purpose is to help design organizations.  Its underlying assumption is
that an organizations primary role is an information processing one.
Contingency theory and the “fit” criteria are the organizing concepts for the creation and
development of the knowledge base used by Organizational Consultant.  The knowledge base
appears as a system of decision rules, or rules that generally apply under specific sets of
circumstances.
The knowledge base has over 450 rules.  An example of a rule is proposition 5.12: “If the
organization is large, then formalization should be high (cf 20).”  The cf stands for certainty
factor and can range from -100 to 100.  The certainty factor measures the degree of belief (or
disbelief for negative certainty factors) one has in the rule statement.  These certainty factors are
set in Organizational Consultant by the developers as default values based on their experience
and cumulative research.  These certainty factors where not modified by the author. Certainty
factors are also used in the input by the user to answer the questions posed by Organizational
Consultant and in the recommendations provided after the system has analyzed the organization.
The problem of organizational design is difficult when one considers the many different
variables and combinations possible.  For example, an organization can be defined as to whether
it is centralized or not, formalized or not, and whether it has a simple, divisional, functional, or
ad hoc configuration.  In this situation, there are 2x2x4=16 different possible designs from which
to chose.  The number of choices grows non-linearly as the number of organizational dimensions
grows (Burton and Obel, 1995, p. 321). To consider all the possibilities, without the aid of a
computer, would be monumental at best.  The Organizational Consultant expert system allows
the user to examine many different variables and possibilities in a short period of time.
Organizational Consultant analyzes the current organizational structure using many facts related
to the functioning of the organization.  The structure is then described in terms of configuration
and its properties.  Based on the input, the system, using the rule set in the knowledge base,
recommends the configuration and structural properties that give the best fit for the specified
situation.  The situation itself is analyzed and possible situational or organizational misfits are
given. Finally, the current and prescribed organizational structures are compared, and possible
changes are recommended.  The system allows the user to change input values and rerun the
consultation.  This is a way to perform sensitivity analyses (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 31).
More information on Contingency Theory and the Organizational Consultant expert system can
be found in the Burton and Obel text,  Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design (1998).
Inputs to Organizational Consultant
Based on user input, Organizational Consultant recommends the structure and its structural
properties that give the best result within the specified situation.  The situation itself is analyzed
and possible situational or organizational misfits are given.
Inputs to Organizational Consultant are separated into twelve sections: current configuration,
current complexity, current formalization, current centralization, size, age/ownership, diversity,
technology, environment, management profile, strategy factors, and climate factors.
Some of the answers to the questions posed by Organizational Consultant can be very subjective.
For example, in the current centralization section, the question, “How much discretion does the
typical middle manager have over hiring and firing personnel?”, ha  as possible answers “no
answer, very great, great, some, little, or none.” What is the difference between some and little?
The answer is very subjective. Given the same situation, one person may answer differently than
another. “No answer” is always an answer if the question is not applicable.
Confidence factors (0 to 100) are included as an input for each question to measure how sure the
user of Organizational Consultant is in the answers to each question.  A high confidence factor
(i.e. 100) means that the user is positive in the value of the answer and Organizational Consultant
will fully weigh the propositions associated with that question.  A lower confidence factor will
not weigh the associated propositions as strongly.
When answering the questions for the proposed organization, several assumptions were made by
the author.  There was a realistic  progression of the Navy as it moved into the proposed
structure.  There were no real radical changes in the basic Navy way of life: there are still
Officers and Enlisted personnel, salary is set on a chart as it is today, bonuses are paid to some
people and not to others, promotions are determined by a selection board (for officers) and a
multiple score primarily determines advancement for enlisted personnel, fitness reports and
evaluations were still used.  Forces are still commanded by a commander responsible overall for
the operation and accountable for the forces actions. The Chief Executive of the organization is
the Force Commander. Top Management consists of the Force Commander and the other
commanders (CKO, CRO, CEFO, C O).  Middle management are the KO, RO, EFO, OPS and
platform commanders.
Organizational Consultant expert system is designed to look at the entire organization. It can not
consider adaptation of the organization or different processes within the organization. NCW has
two distinct processes, planning and execution. The planning process is highly centralized, where
the force commander is deciding on the intent and the overall strategy for the forces.  In the
execution process, the commander has delivered the intent and has stepped back to allow the
forces to self-synchronize their actions. Here centralization is very low.
These two different “snapshots” of NCW organization, planning and execution, were used to
answer the questions posed by Organization Consultant. Each of the two snapshots had a slightly
different output from Organizational Consultant.
The authors will briefly review each input category and discuss the rational behind the input of
each section, both from a planning and execution point of view.  Answers to each question are
available from the authors along with the reasoning for each question.
Current Configuration
Configuration specifies the way an organization divides work, breaks tasks into subtasks, and
coordinates these activities.  An organization can be described as simple, functional, divisional, a
machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, or matrix configuration.
This organization has elements of the following four configurations: functional, divisional,
simple, and ad hoc.
The functional configuration has unit grouping by functional specialization (production,
marketing, finance, human resources, and so on) (ORGCON, 1998). The NCW organization is
broken down into functional groups: Situational Awareness (SA), Operations (OPS), Logistics
(LOG), and Effects (EFF).  Each of these groups, which cross all platforms (divisional
configuration), allows the organization to interact within each functional area.
A divisional configuration has self-contained, somewhat autonomous units, coordinated by a
headquarters unit (product, customer, or geographical grouping including multinational)
(ORGCON, 1998). In this configuration each platform is clearly a separate division, operating
very autonomously (yet synchronizing with other divisions).
The simple configuration has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision
making. This is a "one man show." (ORGCON, 1998) For the NCW organization the force
commander clearly is in charge of the planning process.  On the execution side, the “chiefs” of
each functional division are in charge of their own simple (flat) organization, as they are in
charge of the officers on each platform within their functional area.
The ad hoc configuration is characterized by high horizontal differentiation, low vertical
differentiation, low formalization, decentralization, and great flexibility and responsiveness.
(ORGCON, 1998) Under this configuration, forces are self-synchronizing.  Forces come together
with a common purpose (a mission which is clarified by the commander’s intent), yet they are
not directed how to carry it out.  The ad hoc body must decide among themselves how to
proceed. This is the heart of self-synchronization accomplished during the execution of a
mission.
Although there are elements of each of the four configurations in the organization, a simple
configuration captures the essence of the NCW organization during the planning process while
an ad hoc configuration describes the execution process.
Complexity is a measure of horizontal (specialization within the organization), vertical (depth of
the organization hierarchy), and spatial (amount of geographic dispersion of the organization)
differentiation.  As the degree of complexity increases, the need for coordination and the
requirement for organizational information processing increases (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 69).
Complexity for the NCW organization is characterized by 2 levels, 16 to 30 geographic locations
and a moderate number of job titles.
Formalization is the degree to which jobs and procedures within the organization are
standardized, rule based, and in writing (Burton and Oel, 1998, p. 73).  The greater the number
of written rules and procedures the higher the formalization. In most studies, the measurement of
formalization has been related to written rules (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 73).  For the NCW
organization (being a military organization) written job descriptions are available for all
employees.  The planning process has loose compliance with standards as the process is carried
out higher in the organization (closer to the force commander who can easily change the
standards).  The execution process demands more compliance with standards and is supervised
closer.
Centralization is the degree to which formal authority to make discretionary choices is
concentrated in an individual, unit, or level (usually high in the organization).  Centralization is
measured by how much direct involvement top managers have in gathering and interpreting the
information used in decision making and the degree to which top management directly controls
the execution of a decision (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 75).  For the NCW organization, top
management is greatly involved with the gathering and interpreting of information during the
planning process and not directly involved in execution of these decisions.  The typical middle
manager has little control over establishing budget (usually set by outside authority), little
discretion over how his or her unit will be evaluated, some discretion over hiring and firing
personnel, and little discretion over rewards (salary and promotions).
Size is one of the variables that influences the choice of an organizational structure. Size is used
here as a measure of the information processing capacity. A larger organization requires greater
information processing capacity (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 153). An organization of over 2,000
is considered large by Organizational Consultant.  Here the author assumes a large organization
with 3,000 people.
Age of the NCW organization can be young, mature or old. The age of the NCW organization is
young due to the relatively short tour lengths of military personnel, constant turnover, as well as
the dynamic nature of individual units rotating within Joint Task Forces of today.  Ownership of
the NCW organization is public/state owned.
Diversity is a measurement of the number of different products that the organization produces,
the number of markets the organization competes in and the number of markets overseas. The
NCW organization is considered to have “many” different products (products are considered to
be different weapons types and different kinds of forces) and compete in “some” different
markets. The question concerning overseas markets was not answered as naval forces always
operate overseas during conflicts.
Technology is the information, equipment, techniques, and processes required to transform
inputs into outputs (Burton and Obel, 1998, p 213). The technology required to carry out the
NCW organization is considered to be highly advanced.  The major activity of the NCW
organization is production - providing energy (via a weapon’s effect), at a given location, at a
given time.  The planning process has bot   routine (easy to analyze problems and few
exceptions) and non-routine (difficult to resolve problems and many exceptions) technology.
The execution process has primarily non-routine technology.
The environment can be described as simple or complex, by the amount of uncertainty in the
environment, the amount of equivocality in the environment, and rating the toughness of the
competition.  For the NCW organization (both planning and execution) the environment is
complex, uncertainty is high, and the competition is extreme. The equivocality of the planning
process is higher than the execution process, as the force commander is trying to determine what
course of action to follow, often without knowing specific adversary or engagement locations
and intentions.
Management profile is concerned with the question of whether management or leadership style
affect the choice and fit of the organizational structure. The Organizational Consultant questions
in this section concern types of decisions made by top management, the level of information used
to make these decisions, a proactive or reactive approach to taking action, and the top
management’s attitude towards risk.  The NCW organization is characterized by top
management making policy and general decisions, long term decisions, being risk neutral, and
taking proactive actions. During the planning process top management will use very detailed
information to make decisions, while during the execution process only aggregate information as
they will not be heavily involved in the execution process.
Strategy is the determination of the basic long term goals of an organization, the adoption of
courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals (Burton
and Obel, 1998, p. 248). The NCW organization was characterized as having a high capital
requirement, medium product innovation, medium process innovation, and high concern for
quality.
The organizational climate refers to the beliefs and attitudes held by individuals about their
organization. The climate is a relatively enduring quality of an organization that is experienced
by employees and also influences their behavior (Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 113).  Climate
questions were answered in the best possible, yet still realistic, manner, indicating high trust,
medium conflict within the organization, high morale, a moderately equitable rewards system,
high leadership credibility and low scapegoating.
Results
Organizational Consultant uses the knowledge base of over 450 “if-then” statements to analyze
the organization.  Organizational Consultant also provides written comments about why a
particular conclusion was reached.
Recommendations are made with a certainty factor associated with them.  In the conclusion,
certainty factors may take any value between -100 and +100.  The higher the numerical value of
the certainty factor, the stronger the conclusion.  In general, certainty factors between 0 and 30
indicate a low certainty, 30 to 60 indicate medium certainty, and 60 or above indicates high
certainty. Above 80, the recommendation is almost certain.
Sensitivity analysis can also be performed to analyze a questionable result more closely.
Changing the answers to one or two questions can change the results and conclusions of
Organizational Consultant.  This can provide valuable insights into the organization.
Table 1 is a summary of results from Organizational Consultant.
Table 1. Results from Organizational Consultant.
NCW Organization (Planning)NCW Organization (Execution)
SIZE Large (80) Large (80)
CLIMATE Developmental (76) Developmental (76)
MICROINVOLVEMENT Low (73) Low (80)
STRATEGY Analyzer with innovation (72)
Prospector (65)
Prospector (76)










Low (55) Medium (80)Low (51)
High (51)
VERTICAL DIFF. Low (80) Low (79) Low (80) Low (59)
High (51)
SPATIAL DIFF. High (80) High (80)
CENTRALIZATION Medium
(81)
High (50) Medium (85)Low (48)
FORMALIZATION Medium
(76)
Low (71) High (76) Low (77)
SPAN OF CONTROL Moderate (60) Narrow (58)
MEDIA RICHNESS High (85)
Providing a large amount of
information (85)
High (85)
Providing a large amount of
information (95)
INCENTIVES Results (85) Results (95)
COORDINATION AND
CONTROL






















1) You may consider decreasing
the number of positions for
which job descriptions are
available.
2) You may give supervisors and
middle manager fewer rules and
procedures.
3) Managerial employees may be
asked to pay less attention to
written instructions and
procedures.
4) You may consider fewer
written job descriptions.
5) Top management may control
the execution of decisions more
actively.
6) The typical middle manager
may be given less discretion
over how work exceptions are to
be handled.
1) You may consider decreasing
the number of positions for which
job descriptions are available.
2) You may give supervisors and
middle manager fewer rules and
procedures.
3) Managerial employees may be
ask d to pay less attention to
written instructions and
procedures.
4) You may consider fewer
written job descriptions.
5) Middle managers maybe given
more discretion over evaluations.
6) The typical middle manager
may be given more discretion
over personnel rewards.
7) Middle managers may be given
more discretion over establishing
budgets.
8) The typical middle manager
may be given more discretion
over establishing a new program
or project.
Detailed results for the planning and execution processes from Organizational Consultant are
available from the authors.  Below, each result and the recommendation from Organizational
Consultant are discussed. Remarks are taken from the Organizational Consultant results.
The NCW Organization, for both the planning and execution process, is considered a large
organization.
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size
is large (confidence factor [f] 80). Between 51 and 75 % of the people employed
by NCW Organization have a high level of education. Adjustments are made to
this effect. The adjusted number of employees is greater than 2,000 and NCW
Organization is categorized as large.
The organizational climate is the summary measure of people and behavior.  Both the planning
and execution processes of the NCW organization have a developmental climate.
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational
climate is a developmental climate (cf 76).
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and
creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are
considered to be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations
together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on
being on the leading edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are
important. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new
resources. Success means having unique and new products or services and being a
product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual
initiative and freedom.
The rationale behind the recommendation is:
When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the
organization has a developmental climate. Employees with a high morale is
frequently one element of a developmental climate. Moderately to high equitable
rewards in the organization drives the climate towards a developmental climate.
Medium to high leader credibility characterizes an organization with a
developmental climate. An organization with a medium level of scap goating
may have a developmental climate.
Micro-involvement
Micro-involvement is a leadership characteristic, not an organizational characteristic. The level
of management's micro-involvement in decision making is the summary measure of management
style. Leaders have a low preference for micro-involvement; managers have a high preference
for micro-involvement (ORGCON, 1998)
The NCW Organization management profile, during the planning process, has a low preference
for micro-involvement (cf 73). The execution process also has a low preference for micro-
involvement, but with a higher confidence factor (f 80).
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning for low micro-involvement by the NCW organization
was:
The management of NCW Organization has a preference for delegating decisions.
This will lead toward a low preference for micro-involvement. Management has a
long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a preference for a
low micro-involvement.
The management of NCW Organization has a preference for taking actions when
making decisions. This will lead toward a low preference for micro-involvement
because meeting the problems before they arise allow you to work on the general
level and not being consumed with the very detailed decisions that can best be
made at lower level in the organization.
Management has a preference for motivating people and not using contr l wh ch
will lead toward a low preference for micro-involvement.
The execution process had an additional reason for a low level of micro-involvement:
Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the basis of very
aggregate information a low preference for micro-involvement characterization is
appropriate.
Strategy
The organization's strategy is categorized, following Miles and Snow's (1978) typology, as one
of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor.
This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred
strategy for the organization. (ORGCON, 1998)
  Organizational Consultant concluded that for the planning process the current strategy is likely
an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 72), however, it could also be a prospector strategy (cf
65). Based on the answers provided for the execution process, the NCW organization's current
strategy is likely a prospector strategy (cf 76).
An analyzer with innovation strategy is for an organization that combines the strategy of the
prospector and the defender.  It moves into the production of  a new product or enters a new
market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an analyzer without innovation, it has
innovations that run concurrently with the regular production. (ORGCON, 1998)
The prospector strategy is for an organization that continually searches for market opportunities
and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, the
organization is often the creator of change and uncertainty to which it competitors must respond.
However, because of its strong concern for product and market innovation, a prospector is
usually not completely efficient. (ORGCON, 1998)
A defender strategy is for an organization that has a narrow product market domain. Top
managers in this type of organization are experts in their organization’s limited area of operation
but do not tend to search outside their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow
focus, these organizations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure,
or methods of operation.  Instead they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of
their existing operations. (ORGCON, 1998)
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind an analyzer with innovation strategy for the
planning process is:
For a medium routine technology, NCW Organization has some flexibility. It is
consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high
quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy for NCW
Organization.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning for a prospector strategy, for both the planning and
execution process is:
For a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development or market
opportunities exploitation, it requires a high capital investment. NCW
Organization has numerous products. A prospector is constantly seeking new
product opportunities to serve the existing and potentially new customers. With a
concern for high quality a prospector strategy is a likely strategy for NCW
Organization. With top management preferring a relatively low level of micro-
involvement, the strategy is likely to be prospector.
There was an additional statement for the reasoning behind the conclusion for the execution
process:
A non-routine technology is likely to be costly for NCW Organization, and a
prospector strategy of new product development where margins are likely to be
high is very reasonable.
The authors agree with the strategy types assigned by Organizational Consultant.  The planning
process has experts in their respective areas and is concerned with efficiencies (defender
strategy). It also searches for new opportunities and wants to be the creator of change, creating
uncertainty for the enemy. Also, the planning process will most likely not try out new products
until their viability has been shown (analyzer with innovation strategy).
The execution process is looking for new opportunities to exploit, is the creator of change, and
desires to create uncertainty for the enemy (prospector strategy).
Complexity
Organizational complexity is the combined degree of horizontal, vertical, and spatial
differentiation.
The current horizontal differentiation, in both planning and execution, is medium (cf 80). It is
recommended to be low (cf 55) for the planning process and either low (cf 51) or high (cf 51) for
the execution process.
The current vertical differentiation, in both planning and execution, is low (f 80) and matches
the recommended low level (cf 79 for planning and cf 59 for execution). The execution process
could also have a high level of vertical differentiation (cf 51).
Spatial differentiation is high (cf 80) for the NCW organization.
Organizational Consultant concluded that the current organizational complexity is medium for
both the planning and execution processes (cf 82). Organizational consultant is split, with very
close confidence factors, for the recommended level of organizational complexity.  For the
planning process the  recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 55), h ever,
it could also be medium (cf 54).  For the execution process the recommended degree of
organizational complexity is medium (cf 54), high (cf 54) or low (cf 51).
The reasoning behind a low level of complexity is:
Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental
uncertainty and the environmental equivocality of NCW Organization are high. In
this situation, the organizational complexity should be low. This allows the
organization to adapt quickly. When the environmental hostility of NCW
Organization is high, organizational complexity should be low.
The reasoning behind a medium level of complexity is:
Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational
complexity. NCW Organization has a technology that is somewhat routine, which
implies that the organizational complexity should be medium. Because NCW
Organization has an advanced information system, organizational complexity can
be greater than it could otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization
requires a medium level of complexity.
Finally, the reasoning behind a high level of complexity, only for the execution process, is:
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. Then, the organizational complexity
should be either low or high. NCW Organization has a non-routine technology,
which implies that the organizational complexity should be high. Top
management of NCW Organization has a preference for a low level of micro-
involvement, which allows for a higher organizational complexity. Because NCW
Organization has an advanced information system, organizational complexity can
be greater than it could otherwise. Since the size of NCW Organization is large
and NCW Organization has a non-routine technology, the complexity should be
high - particularly the vertical differentiation.
With such close confidence factors, low (55) and medium (54) for the planning process, and
medium (54), high (54) and low (51) for the execution process, the author concludes that a
medium level of complexity is probably the best level for the NCW organization. The
organization was not designed to be complex, rather it was designed to minimize the number of
interactions, and repeat the basic functions (SA, LOG, EFF, OPS) on each platform.
Centralization
Centralization is measured on two main factors: 1) how much involvement top managers have in
gathering and interpreting the information they use to make decisions; and 2) the degree to which
top management directly controls the execution of the decision.
For both the planning (cf 81) and execution (cf 85) process the current centralization is medium.
The recommended levels of centralization are, as expected, high (cf 50) for the planning process
and low (cf 48) for execution.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind high centralization for the planning process is:
When there is a high capital requirement and the product innovation is medium,
as is the case for NCW Organization, centralization should be rather high to
obtain efficiency. When the environment is extremely hostile, top management
must take  prompt action and centralization must be high. Because NCW
Organization has an advanced information system, centralization can be  greater
than it could otherwise.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind low centralization for the execution process is:
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy.  A low centralization is required so
that the organization can react and innovate quickly. Large organizations should
have low centralization. Since NCW Organization operates in a complex
environment and knows only some of the factors  that affect the organization and
when the values of the factors are relatively  unstable, centralization should be
low. Low centralization can be allowed when top management has no desire for
micro-involvement. A developmental climate in the organization requires a
medium to low level of centralization.
These results are expected as the planning process is highly centralized, with the force
commander deciding upon the intent. On the other hand, the execution process is very de-
centralized with forces self-synchronizing their efforts, based on the commander’s intent.
Formalization
Formalization is the degree to which jobs and procedures within the organization are
standardized, rule based, and in writing
The current formalization is medium (cf 76) for the planning process and high (cf 76) for the
execution process in the NCW organization.
Organization consultant recommends a low degree of formalization (cf 71) for the planning
process:
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known
and since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and
procedures can be developed, which implies that NCW Organization's
formalization should be low. When environmental hostility is high formalization
should be low. Low formalization is consistent with top management having a
low preference for micro-involvement. A developmental climate in the
organization requires a low level of formalization.
Organization consultant also recommends a low degree of formalization (cf 77) for the execution
process, but for different reasons:
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. A low formalization is required so
that the organization can react quickly. Low formalization is also required
because of the need for innovations. Organizations with non-routine technology
should have low formalization. When environmental hostility is high
formalization should be low. Low formalization is consistent with top
management having a low preference for micro-involvement. A developmental
climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization.
The authors agree that formalization will need to be lowered in the NCW organization. There
will still need to be some formalization, to keep reports and interactions standard, however
overall formalization in the NCW organization should be low.
Span of Control
Due to information networking and force self-synchronization, the author believes that a large
(high) span of control could be obtained in the NCW organization.
However, Organizational Consultant recommends that the span of control should be moderate (cf
60) during planning and narrow (cf 58) during execution:
Since NCW Organization (planning process) has some technology routineness, it
should have a moderate span of control.
and
Since NCW Organization (execution process) has a non-routine technology, it
should have a narrow span of control.
The underlying factor in determining span of control is the routineness of the technology. Recall
that the planning process had “some” technology routiness - both easy to analyze problems and
few exceptions (a routine technology) and difficult to resolve problems and many exceptions
(non-routine technology) - while the execution process had non-routine technology.  Clearly, the
level of technology routineness does not capture the concept of self-synchronization.
This may indicate that the large span of control, envisioned by the author, is too difficult. The
NCW organization may need more “middle managers” in the organization or more Mission
Commanders when the span of control is too great for the force commander.  It may also indicate
that the CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO will need to do more to allow the force commander a wider
span of control.
Media Richness
The NCW organization should use media with high media richness (cf 85).  The
information media that NCW organization uses should provide a large amount of
information (planning - cf 85, execution - cf 95).
Large amounts of information will need to be processed in the NCW organization.  The right
information, with the desired level of detail, must be available to the right person, at the right
time, and in the right format for ease of understanding and decision making.
Incentives
Incentives should be based on results (planning - cf 85, execution - cf 95).
Results are what matter in warfare. However, it is the results of the entire force, not just one
individual or unit grouping, that matter. The needs of the force and its effective utilization must
be the driving factor for everyone in the organization.
Coordination and Control
Organizational Consultant recommends meetings as the means for coordination and control (cf
86) during the planning process.
When the environment of NCW Organization has high equivocality, high
uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained
through integrators and group meetings. Coordination within each division is very
important. Coordination between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top
management, which is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of
funds between (among) the divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by
sharing technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison
managers and technology committees are possible coordination mechanisms.
Conferences among technical professionals can be very effective. When the
organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained using
planning, integrators and meetings.
During execution, however, professionalization (cf 100) should be used for coordination and
control.
With a non-routine technology NCW Organization should obtain coordination
and control via group meetings. When NCW Organization's environment has
medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and
control should be obtained through integrators and group meetings. An open
organizational climate and team spirit must be fostered. Information must be
shared among all levels. Constructive conflict on 'what to do' will be usual.
Individual tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty will be necessary. Individual
performance evaluation will be problematic and largely subjective. Mutual
adjustments of 'give and take' will be the norm. Frequent informal meetings and
temporary task forces will be the primary coordinating devices. When the
organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained using
planning, integrators and meetings.
These supportive comments for professionalization are what one would expect for a self-
synchronizing force.  Professionals are trained to behave in a standardized way.  From an
information-processing point of view, professionals with skills can process more information
than less skilled employees (Burton, 1998, p. 158).
Configuration
The most likely configuration for the planning process is be divi ional (cf 69), matrix (cf 62) or
an adhocracy (cf 60) configuration.  For the execution process, the configuration is likely either
an adhocracy (cf 73) or simple (cf 65) configuration.
The following is a description of each of the four possible configurations:
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit grouping into
relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, (product, customer, or
geographical grouping).
A matrix structure is a structure that assigns specialists from functional
departments to work on one or more interdisciplinary teams that are led by project
leaders. Permanent product teams are also possible. A dual hierarchy manages the
same activities and individuals at the same time.
An adhocracy organization is normally an organization with high horizontal
differentiation, low vertical differentiation, low formalization, decentralization,
and great flexibility and responsiveness.
A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and
decision making.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind recommending a divisional configuration for the
planning process is:
When the organization is large, the configuration can be a divisional
configuration. Because the organization has many products, the configuration
should be divisional. The divisionalization of NCW Organization may be based
on products or product groups. Because the technology is not fully divisible, care
should be taken in recommending a divisional configuration.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind recommending a matrix configuration for the
planning process is:
When NCW Organization has many products or markets, a matrix configuration
is a likely configuration. When NCW Organization's environment has neither low
equivocality nor low complexity, the configuration should be matrix. When NCW
Organization is large, the configuration can be a matrix configuration. An
organization with a developmental climate could have a matrix configuration.
Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind recommending an adhocracy configuration for the
planning and execution process is:
An adhocracy configuration is appropriate when neither the environmental
equivocality of NCW Organization nor the environmental uncertainty is low.
NCW Organization has many products or many markets which indicates that an
adhocracy is an appropriate configuration. When the organization is also young,
the conclusion that it should bean adhocracy is further strengthened. Since top
management has a low preference for micro-involvement, the ad hoc
configuration is feasible. However, the size of the organization is not very
important for the choice of an adhocracy configuration.
Finally, Organizational Consultant’s reasoning behind recommending a simple configuration for
the execution process is:
The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the
organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental
hostility requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapid to
unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration. A
prospector like NCW Organization can be configured as a simple organization.
Interesting to note is that the anticipated configuration, adhocracy was recommended for the
execution process. An adhocracy is the heart of the self-synchronization process.  Forces
mutually adjust to each other.
On the other hand, the anticipated configuration for the planning process, a simple configuration,
was not recommended.  This is due to the fact that there are many products in the planning
process of the NCW organization and a divisional configuration is best suited for a production
process.
As discussed at the end of Chapter IV, even though there are two distinct processes occurring
within the organization, there is still only one NCW organization. Changing between
configurations (divisional in the planning process and an adhocracy in the execution process)
will be difficult. A mix of both divisional and adhocracy configurations will be required.
Misfits
Organizational Consultant describes two type of misfits - situational and organizational (design
parameter).  Situational misfits occur when the design situations are not internally consistent, e.g.
Organizational Consultant’s recommendations for a highly equivocal environment are not
consistent with those for a routine technology. Organizational misfits exist whenever the level of
an organization design parameter differs significantly from the level recommended by
Organizational Consultant. (Burton, 1998, p 392)
Situational Misfits
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy. There are
no situation misfits (cf 100).
This indicates that a high level of internal consistency exists, both in the planning and execution
processes of the proposed NCW organization, between the contingency factors for organizational
structure (strategy, size, ownership, technology, environment, and management preferences).
There is a fit between the NCW organization, both in planning and execution, and the multiple
contingency factors.
Organizational Misfits
While there were no situational misfits, there were organizational misfits in both the
planning and execution processes of the NCW organization in the categories complexity,
centralization, and formalization. Configuration was also an organizational misfit for the
planning process of the NCW organization.
The current organizational complexity was medium for both the planning and execution process.
The recommended configurations all had very close confidence factors (low (cf 55) and medium
(cf 54) for planning and medium (cf 54), high (cf 54), and low (cf 51) for execution) indicating
that any one may be the best configuration.  As discussed earlier, it is the authors opinion that a
medium level of organizational complexity is best for the NCW organization.
Centralization was recommended to be high during the planning process or low during
execution. These results were expected for the NCW organization. What was not expected was
centralization to be characterized as medium for the current situation. Centralization was
expected to be high during planning and low during execution for the current situation (as
Organizational Consultant recommended). This difference, between current and recommended
centralization, caused centralization to be identified as an organizational misfit.
Formalization was recommended to be low in the NCW organization but characterized as either
medium (planning) or high (execution) in the current organization.  This is an area where the
Navy will need to change. Formalization should be low.  Due to the anticipated environmental
hostility (high), the Navy will need to change the formality of the organization and allow more
independent actions, rather than rigid following of procedures and rules. Procedures and rules
have their place, but creativity and looking at situations in new ways will become paramount.
The configuration was an organizational misfit only for the planning process.  The author
characterized the best configuration to be a simple one during the planning process.
Organizational Consultant recommended either a divisional, matrix, or adhocracy configuration,
hence the misfit.
More Detailed Recommendations
Organizational Consultant had a number of additional recommendations for the NCW
organization.
Common to both the planning and execution process were four recommendations:
· “You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are
available.”
·   “You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures.”
·  “Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and
procedures.”
· “You may consider fewer written job descriptions.”
These recommendations call for less formalization within the NCW organization. This agrees
with previous discussions concerning lowering the level of formalization in the NCW
organization and the Navy.
There were two additional recommendations for the planning process:
· “Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively.”
· “The typical middle manager may be given less discretion over how work exceptions
are to be handled.”
These recommendations call for more centralization during the planning process, clearly desired
in the NCW organization.
There were four more recommendations for the execution process of the NCW organization:
· “Middle managers may be given more discretion over evaluations.”
·  “The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over personnel rewards.”
· “Middle managers may be given more discretion over establishing budgets.”
·  “The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over establishing a new
program or project.”
Each of these recommendations calls for empowering the lower levels of the NCW organization
during execution.
Overall Assessment
Is the proposed Command and Control structure fit in a NCW environment?  Does the
organization have a total design fit, where the situation fit, design parameter fit, and contingency
fit are all in balance?
The NCW organization fits s uationally and with several changes, can fit organizationally as
well, thereby obtaining total design fit.  There were no situational misfits and each of the
organizational misfits can be resolved for the NCW organization.  The NCW organization will
need to change in several categories and each change will be good for the NCW organization.
The NCW organization will need to have a medium level of organizational complexity, high
centralization during the planning process and low centralization during execution, low
formalization throughout the NCW organization, and adopt a different configuration during the
planning process.
4.  Issues
When adopting a new organization there are major issues to confront.  Change is never easy and
there is always the inertia of the status quo to overcome.  But if one does not think about the
impacts and experiment with proposed solutions, total success of the organization will never be
achieved.  In adopting this new organization there are some major issues to confront.
Cultural
Cultural barriers are debatably the hardest ones to overcome.  Adopting this new organization
will require significant shifts in organizational culture.  It calls for new commanders with new
responsibilities.  This will mean that the traditional roles of a ship’s commanding officer will
change.  Convincing the navy traditionalist that this change is for the better and will result in a
stronger, more robust force, will be difficult. A strong case, based on results of experiments and
war games, will be required to prove that this organization is effective and efficient in the NCW
environment.
Trust
Trust is an important issue to consider. Both trust by the force commander in the lower level
commanders and sailors, but also trust by the lower level commanders and sailors in the force
commander.  Forces will not self-synchronize if their actions are being excessively questioned by
the commander. Platform commanders will also have to trust that their protective safety and the
effective use of their assets (sensors and weapons) is being accomplished by the functional
commanders.
Training
Training forces as a whole, planning operations together, and fighting as one entity, not separate
platforms, will be key to the NCW organization’s success.  Teamwork and understanding the
commander’s intent will greatly enhance the forces’ performance.
Grooming a cadre of personnel capable of performing the overarching functions is necessary.
They need to be tracked from the very beginning of their careers with a detailed career path of
schools and sequential job assignments.  It is he only way that the force will be experienced
enough within each functional area to exercise a large span of control.
Joint
This organization is designed for the Navy. Wh t about the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force?
Will the other services be able to operate with the Navy in this structure or will they need to
adopt a similar structure to allow coordination amongst the services?  Experimentation, both by
the Navy and other services, will be required to see if this organization is compatible with the
evolving structures of other services.
Coalition
Can we operate with coalition partners in a NCW environment? Will we need to provide them
equipment (and money for the capital requirements) so they can be part of the network? Will our
speed of command be so fast that we will leave our coalition partners out of the fight?  These are
major questions which need to be addressed by the Navy’s senior leadership, as NCW is
developed, regardless of whether or not the proposed organization is adopted.
5. Recommendations
Organizational Consultant
The Organizational Consultant expert system, while a useful tool for analyzing organizations,
could be improved.
Organizational Consultant is based on research conducted in the civilian world.  The military
environment is unique.  While many of the lessons learned from the civilian world do apply in
military situations, there may be some that do not. A military version of Organizational
Consultant would be useful.
It was hard for Organizational Consultant to capture the total organization and the adaptability
that is envisioned.  The flexibility that Mission Commanders provide to the organization and
how it can adapt was not fully captured by Organizational Consultant.  Organizational
Consultant only provides a static snapshot of the organization.  The adaptive process and
structure of the NCW organization was not fully captured in Organizational Consultant.
Finally, it can be difficult to understand how a change in one input changes the output of
Organizational Consultant.  The capability to understand, perhaps visualize in a flowchart, the
complex interactions analyzed by Organizational Consultant would be helpful.
Experiments and War Games
Experiments and war games are the first step to validating this, or any other, new organizational
structure.  The Navy’s new Maritime Battle Center in Newport, Rhode Island, is the place where
this organization could be analyzed and explored in depth.
Toward the end of the experimental stage, actual implementation in a Fleet Battle Experiment
would either verify the organization’s concepts or prove them unfeasible. New organizational
structures need to be exp rimented with by fleet participants.
Future Research
There is still much research to be conducted in exploring organizations for the network centric
environment. Some possible topics include:
· Are there better organizational structure for NCW?
· What are the details of the process of self-synchronization? How is self-synchronization
executed?
· What is the maximum span of control in a network centric environment?
· Which processes can have low formalization and which ones need to remain high?
· What effect does NCW have on coalition partners? Can we operate with them in a
network centric world?
6. Conclusion
Regardless of whether this organization is adopted for further exploration or not, a fresh look at
organizational structures for the NCW environment is useful.  This thesis, and the conclusion
that the proposed organization can be made to fit organizationally, is one step in that direction.
Brigadier General J.P. Kiszely has stated that “without originality, let alone genius, the new
technologies will merely be grafted onto existing organizations and doctrines in a way designed
to cause the least inconvenience and least unpleasantness in peacetime. The risks of having
operated on this principle in the past are as nothing to the dangers of doing so in the future.”
(Roman, 1998, p. 2)  The United States Navy must find, and adopt, an organizational structure
which is efficient and effective for the network centric warfare environment.
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